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Abstract
This paper generalizes the conditional expectation framework by replacing the Hilbert-
norm with a more general measure of approximation errors. This enables one to develop
the concept of conditioning for non-expectation certainty equivalents. Under this concept
a single-agent model, in which the optimal level of information is endogenously determined
through the agent’s optimization behavior, can be constructed. In this setting it is possible
for the anti-preference for information to dominate the benefits of better planning available
under more information. In $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}_{)}$ I show that the “biasedness” of this new conditioning
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1. Introduction
This paper generalizes the conditional expectation&amework by replacing the Hilbert-
norm ( $i.e.,$ $L^{2}$-norm) with a more general measure of approximation errors, which enables us to
develop the concept of conditioning for non-expectation oertainty equivalents, and to construct
a $\sin_{\mathrm{o}}^{g}1$ -agent model in whi& the optimal level of information is endogenously determined
through the agent’s optimization behavior, and in which the anti-preference for information could
dominate the benefits of better planning which would become $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}4$able under more information.
We ffist develop the concept of conditioning $M(x|\mathcal{G})$ for non-expectation certainty equiv-
alents. Here $x$ is a random utihty and $\mathcal{G}$ is a $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{b}-\sigma$-algebra which represents partial information
held by the agent. To this end, we assume that the agent is endowed with a functional, by
which she measures apprmimation errors. We then define $M(x|\mathcal{G})$ as the best approximation
to $x$ within the $\mathcal{G}$-measurable functions when approximation errors are measured by this er-
ror ffictional (its $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{U}$-definition will be proved in Proposition 2.2). If the error functional
is specified by the $L^{2}$-norm, $M(x|\mathcal{G})$ coincides with the conditional expectation $E(x|\mathcal{G})$ . We
$\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$ the $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}_{\Leftrightarrow}\sigma$ thus defined as non-Hdbert conditionin9. Given the error functional, we
can define the associated certainty equivalent as the best approximation within the constants.
Therefore, for any (non-expectation) certainty equivalent $M$ , defining its conditioning can be
reduced to finding the error hnctional which defines the given certainty equivalent. The same
error functional is now used to define $M(x|\mathcal{G})$ for any $\mathcal{G}$ . In this manner, Section 3 develops the
$\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma$ for a broad class of non-expectation certainty equivalents.
While the conditional expectation is unbiased, the non-Hilbert conditioning is typically
biased in the sense that $M(M(x|\mathcal{G}))\neq M(x)$ . Here we interpret the LHS as the current “mean”
utihty when the agent expects partial information $\mathcal{G}$ to be obtained in the future, and the
RHS as the current “mean” utihty when the agent expects no more information. Therefore, it
affects agent’s welfare whether or not she gets future information. In particular, obtaining some
information $\mathcal{G}$ may decrease agent’s current utihty, which in turn implies that she may prefer
not to be informed (rather than be informed) although new information would promote better
planning. For example, $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}_{\Leftrightarrow}\sigma\dot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{e}$ the person who hates to be informed of the result of a medical
examination regardless of a better medical treatment he could get if he found some disease. This
aspect is missing in the standard conditional expectation ffamework. In Section 4, a simple 2-
period model $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ be constructed in which the agent chooses the level of information (together
with control variables) in order to maximize her $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathbb{I}$ utihty. We show that it could be the
case that being ignorant is preferred to being informed. This new approach would allow us to
endogenize the evolution of agent’s information in dynamic models as a result of optimization
behavior. In Section 5, we briefly mention the future research along this line.
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2. General Theory
We $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{i}\theta$ the states of the world by a probabihty space $(\Omega,\mathcal{F},\mu)$ , where $F$ is a $\sigma$-algebra
of all conceivable events on $\Omega$ , and $\mu$ is a probabihty measure on $F$. We then define the spaoe
of essentially bounded real-valued ffictions on $\Omega$ by
$L^{\infty}(\mathcal{F})=$ { $x:\Omegaarrow\Re|x$ is $\mathcal{F}$-measurable and $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}\sup_{w\in\Omega}|x(\omega)|<+\infty$ }.
We $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}q_{X}\in L^{\infty}(F)$ with $y\in L^{\infty}(\mathcal{F})$ if $x=y\mu \mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}$ everywhere $(\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{e}.)$ , and simply write
as $x=y$ . That is, we regard $L^{\infty}(F)$ as the set of $\mu-$equivalence cksses of hnctions. We denote
by $F^{*}$ the space of all $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{b}-\sigma$-algebras of $F$. When $\mathcal{G}\in F^{*}$ , we say that $x$ is almost $\mathcal{G}- measu7\mathrm{u}ble$
if there aeists $y$ such that $y$ is $\mathcal{G}$-measurabk and $x=y\mu- \mathrm{a}.\mathrm{e}$. We denote by $L^{\infty}(\mathcal{G})$ the space
of $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$ essentially bounded ahnost $\mathcal{G}$-meaeurable hnctions, which becomes a subspace of $L^{\infty}(F)$ .
In the current paper, any element of $L^{\infty}(\mathcal{F})$ or $L^{\infty}(\mathcal{G})$ may be regarded as a random utihty.
More specifically, we may consider $x$ as $x(\omega)=u(w(\omega),\omega)$ , where $u$ is a state-dependent von
Neumann-Morgenstern utihty function and $w$ is a random income. We are more concerned with
the attitude toward uncertainty (that is, how to $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}_{0}\emptyset \mathrm{T}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}x$over states) rather than the attitude
toward wealth (that is, the curvature of u).
For any $x\in L^{\infty}(F)$ and for any $\mathcal{G}\in F^{*}$ , the conditional expectation $E[x|\mathcal{G}]$ is defined
by
$E[x| \mathcal{G}]=\mathrm{a}x\mathrm{g}\min\{||x-z||_{2}|z\in L^{\infty}(\mathcal{G})\}$ , (1)
where $||\cdot||_{2}$ is the $L^{2}$-norm. This definition is typicaUy applied to $L^{2}$ spaces, in which case
the minimum is always uniquely attained by the orthogonal projection since $L^{2}(\mathcal{G})$ is a closed
subspace of $L^{2}(F)$ . The uniqueness of $E[x|\mathcal{G}]$ is up to a $\mu$-equivalence class and we can always
choose a version which is $\mathcal{G}$-measurable. Because $L^{\infty}\subset L^{2}$ , this definition can be directly
applied to the current context. Furthermore, if the above definition is extended to $L^{1}$ spaces
by the standard approximation argument, it coincides with a more common definition of the




The conditional expectation (1) can be interpreted as the “best” apprmimation to $x$ within the
$\mathcal{G}$-measurable functions when approximation errors are measured by the $L^{2}$-norm.
lThat is, $E[x|\mathcal{G}]$ is defined as a $\mathcal{G}$-meaeurable integrable function which satisfies $( \forall G\in \mathcal{G})\int_{G}E[x|\mathcal{G}]d\mu=$
$\int_{G}xd\mu$. In this regard, aee $\mathrm{B}M$ngsley (1986, p. 477, 34.15).
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We now extend (1) to a more general $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{m}}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma$ concept by replacing the $L^{2}$-norm in
(1) with a more general measure of errors, which we $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ call error functional. To this end, we
first define a partial order on $L^{\infty}(F)$ by
$x\preceq y\Leftrightarrow x_{+}\leq y+$ and $x_{-}\leq y-,$
where $x_{+}$ and $x$-are the positive part and the negative part of $x$ , respectively. This order
measures the “closeness”. That is, $z$ is “closer” to $x$ than $z’$ is if $x-z\preceq x-z’$ . In this case, both
of the overestimate and the $\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\dot{\mathrm{u}}$nnaate (at each state) by $z$ are $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}$]$\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ than those by $z’$ . Ako
note that this order is a proper subset of the order by the absolute values: $x\preceq y\Rightarrow|x|\leq|y|$
but $\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}\Leftarrow \mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}$ general.
Let $X$ be a convex cone of $L^{\infty}(F)$ . In what $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ , we set $X=L^{\infty}(F)$ unless otherwise
stated. An ervvr functional on $X$ is a $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma\Phi$ : $X\mathrm{x}Xarrow\Re$ which satisfies the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ six
axioms.2
El. $(\forall x, z\in X)$ $\Phi(x, z)\geq 0$ ;
E2. $\Phi(x, z)=0\Leftrightarrow x=z$ ;
E3. $x-z\preceq x-z’\Rightarrow\Phi(x, z)\leq\Phi(x, z’)$ ;
E4. $(\forall x\in X)$ $\Phi(x, \cdot)$ is a convex function;
E5. $(\forall x, z_{1}, z_{2}\in X)(\forall\lambda\in(0,1))$
$z_{1}\neq z_{2^{3}}$ and $(\exists \mathcal{G}\in \mathcal{F}^{*})z_{1},$ $z_{2}\in L^{\infty}(\mathcal{G})$ and $x\not\in L^{\infty}(\mathcal{G})$
$\Rightarrow\Phi(x, \lambda z_{1}+(1-\lambda)z_{2})<\lambda\Phi(x, z_{1})+(1-\lambda)\Phi(x, z_{2})|$ and
E6. $(\forall x\in X)(\exists p\in[1, +\infty))$ $||z_{n}-z_{0}||_{\mathrm{p}}arrow 0\Rightarrow\varliminf_{narrow\infty}\Phi(x, z_{n})\geq\Phi(x, z_{0})$ ,
where $||\cdot \mathrm{t}|_{p}$ is the $L^{p}$-norm. The number given by $\Phi(x, z)$ measures the error when we $\mathrm{a}\triangleright$
proximate $x$ by $z$ . El and E2 are normalization axioms which are imposed so that the best
approximation of $x$ is achieved by $x$ itself with no error. E3 requires consistency of the error
with the “closeness” discussed earlier. $\mathrm{E}\not\subset \mathrm{E}6$ are technical axioms which are sufficient for the
existence of the best approximation. E4 and E5 require that $\Phi(x, \cdot)$ is convex and strictly con-
vex, and E6 requires that $\Phi(x, \cdot)$ is strongly lower semi-continuous. $\mathrm{W}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\Phi$ resembles a metric,
we do not impose the symmetric axiom: $\Phi(x, z)=\Phi(z, x)$ .
We can construct an error functional&om the functional $\hat{\Phi}$ : $Xarrow\Re$ which satisfiae:
2The domain of $\Phi$ implicitly requires that $\Phi(x’, z’)=\Phi(x, z)$ if $x’=x\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{e}$. and $z’=z\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{e}$.
$3_{Z_{1}}\neq z_{2}$ means that there does not exist $N$ such that $\{\mathrm{l}v|z_{1}(\omega)\neq z_{2}(\omega)\}\subset N$ and $\mu(N)=0$.
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Nl. $(\forall x\in X)\hat{\Phi}(x)\geq 0$ ;
N2. $\hat{\Phi}(x)=0\Leftrightarrow x=0$ ;
N3. $x\preceq y\Rightarrow\hat{\Phi}(x)\leq\hat{\Phi}(y)$ ;
N4. $(\forall x\in X)\lambda\geq 0\Rightarrow\hat{\Phi}(\lambda x)=\lambda\hat{\Phi}(x)$ ;
N5. $(\forall x,y\in X)\hat{\Phi}(x+y)\leq\hat{\Phi}(x)+\hat{\Phi}(y)$ ;
N6. $\hat{\Phi}(x+y)<\hat{\Phi}(x)+\hat{\Phi}(y)$ unless $(\exists c>0)x=w$ ; and
N7. $(\exists p\in[1,+\infty))$ $||x_{\mathfrak{n}}-x_{0}||_{p}arrow 0\Rightarrow\underline{\mathrm{h}\mathrm{m}}_{narrow\infty}\hat{\Phi}(x_{\mathfrak{n}})\geq\hat{\Phi}(x_{0})$ .
N7 can be repkced by the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ axiom$\cdot$.
N7’. $(\exists p\in[1, +\infty)$ and $K>0$) $(\forall x)$ $\hat{\Phi}(x)\leq K||x||_{\mathrm{p}}$ .
It immediately $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ that N5 and N7’ imply N7. By N4 and N5, $\hat{\Phi}$ is a Minkkowski functional.
While $\hat{\Phi}$ resembles a norm, it is not symmetric in the sense that $\hat{\Phi}(-x)\neq\hat{\Phi}(x)$ .
Lemma 2.1: Define $\Phi(x, z)\equiv\hat{\Phi}(x-z)$ . If $\hat{\Phi}$ satisfies Nl-N7, then $\Phi$ satisfies El-E6.
(Proof in Appendix)
Given an error functional $\Phi$ , we define
$(\forall x\in X)(\forall \mathcal{G}\in \mathcal{F}^{*})$ $M_{\Phi}(x| \mathcal{G})=\arg\min\{\Phi(x,z)|z\in L^{\infty}(\mathcal{G})\}$ . (4)
The class of functions $M_{\Phi}(x|\mathcal{G})$ , if it exists, is the “best” $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\alpha \mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ to $x$ within the ahnost $\mathcal{G}-$
measurable functions where approximation errors are measured by the error functional $\Phi$ . When
$x$ is (almost) $\mathcal{G}$-measurable, $z=x$ uniquely attains the minimum by El and E2. When $x$ is not
(ahnost) $\mathcal{G}$-measurable, the next proposition guarantees the existence of the best approximation.
Proposition 2.2: Let $\Phi$ be an $e77vrfi\mathrm{z}nctional$. Then for any $x$ and for any $\mathcal{G},$ $M_{\Phi}(x|\mathcal{G})$
is well-defined and unique (up $io$ a $\mu$-equivalence class). (Proof in Appendix)
We can always choose a version of $M_{\Phi}(x|\mathcal{G})$ whi&is $\mathcal{G}$-measurable, and refer to it as the
$non- Hilbe\tau t$ conditioning. The non-Hilbert conditioning (4) generalizes the conditional expec-
tation (1), and coincides with $11*$ when $\Phi$ is specified by the $L^{2}$-metric. Any strictly $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\sin_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma$
transformation of $\Phi$ can generate the same conditioning concept.
We define the certainty equivalent 4 generated by an error functional $\Phi$ by
$(\forall x\in X)$ $M_{\Phi}(x)=M_{\Phi}(x|\{\phi,\Omega\})$ . (5)
4The term “certainty equivalent” is used for $M$ only to mean that $M(x)=x$ when $x$ is constant. Recall that
$x$ is now a random $\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}\psi$ rather than a rondom income.
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The $\mu_{r}$-equivalence class of functions $M_{\Phi}(x)$ is the “best” approximation to $x$ within the (almost)
constant functions where approximation errors are measured by $\Phi$ . Again, we can chooee a ver-
sion of $M_{\Phi}(x)$ whi&is constant. The certaintyequivalent- $M_{\Phi}(\cdot)$ generahzes the expectation
functional $E(\cdot)$ , and coincides with it when $\Phi$ is specified by the $L^{2}$-metric. Note that the equa-
tion (5) is the definition while the equation (2) is an implication of the conditional expectation.
Given a oertainty equivalent $M$, we can develop the concept of conditioning for $M$ by seeking
for an error ffinctional $\Phi$ such that $(\forall x)M(x)=M_{\Phi}(x|\{\phi, \Omega\})$ . Such a $\Phi$ then would be used
to define the conditioning of $M$ against any $\mathcal{G}\in F^{*}$ by means of (4). Section 3 develops the
conditioning for a broad ckss of non-expectation certainty equivalents in this way. Henceforth,
we suppress $\Phi$ and simply write as $M(x|\mathcal{G})$ and $M(x)$ when $\Phi$ is understood.
An error hnctional $\Phi$ is of integml $fom\mathrm{L}$ if there exist mappings $\phi$ : $\Re^{2}arrow\Re$ and
$\varphi:\Rearrow\Re$ such that
$( \forall x,z\in X)\Phi(x, z)=\varphi(\int_{\Omega}\phi(x(\omega), z(\omega))\mu(d\omega))$
and if $\Phi$ satisfies EI-E6. The error functionak of this form $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}$ convenient characterization of
$M(x|\mathcal{G})$ and $M(x)$ , which $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ immediately ffom the definition.
Lemma 2.3: Let $\Phi$ be of integml form. If $\phi$ is continuously differentiable in its second
argument and if $\varphi$ is strictly increasing, then, for any $x\in X,$ $M(x)$ is defined as the unique
solution $z$ to
$\int_{\Omega}\phi_{2}(x, z)d\mu=0$
and $M(x|\mathcal{G})$ satisfies $(\forall h\in L^{\infty}(\mathcal{G}))$
$\int_{\Omega}\phi_{2}(x, M(x|\mathcal{G}))hd\mu=0$ .
Lemma 2.4: Let $\Phi$ be of integml $fo7m$. If $\phi$ is twicely continuovsly differentiable and
if $\varphi$ is strictly increasing, then $M(\cdot)$ is Gateavx differentiable and $(\forall x, h\in X)$
$\partial M(x;h)=-\frac{\int_{\Omega}\phi_{21}(x,M(x))hd\mu}{\int_{\Omega}\phi_{22}(x,M(x))d\mu}$ .
For each $x\in X$ , the value of infomation $\mathcal{G}$ is a red number $V_{x}(\mathcal{G})$ defined by
$V_{x}(\mathcal{G})\equiv..M(M(x|\mathcal{G}))-M(x)$ .
Here $M(M(x|\mathcal{G}))$ is the current “mean” utility when the agent expects partial information $\mathcal{G}$ to
be obtained in the future, while $M(x)$ is the current “mean” utihty when the $\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma \mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ expects no
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more idformation. When $M$ coincides with the expectation $E,$ $V_{x}(\mathcal{G})=0$ for any $x$ and for any
$\mathcal{G}$ because of (3). However, $V$ could be either positive or negative in general because
$M(x)\neq M(M(x\}\mathcal{G}))$ . (6)
The “biaeedness” (6) of non-Hilbert conditioning contrasts with the “unbiasedness” (3) of con-
ditional expectation. The agent with the $L^{2}$ error ffinctional is indifferent to the paxtial inffor-
mation she might attain in the future (apart ffom the benefits of better planning which would
become available with the additional information). On the other hand, with the non-Hilbert
conditioning, the agent may strictly prefer to be uninformed. The preferenoe over information
can be introduced only by the “biasedness” of non-Hilbert conditioning. This new feature of
non-Hilbert conditioning $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ be further $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ by the examples in Sections 3 and 4.
3. Examples
This section considers several examples of non-expectation certainty equivalent, for each
of which we develop the concept of conditioning. We ako see its implications to the value of
information.
\’A. $L^{p}$ Error Rnctional
Let $p\in(1, +\infty)$ . The $IPe$rvor functional is defined by:
$\Phi(x,z)\equiv(\int_{\Omega}\phi(x(\omega), z(\omega))d\mu(\omega))^{1/p}$ , where $\phi(x, z)=|x-z|^{p}$ .
This is the metric $0\sigma \mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ by $IP$-norm and clearly satisfies EI-E6. We need to assume that $p\in$
$(1, +\infty)$ since $M(x|\mathcal{G})$ is not unique in general when $p=1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}+\infty$ . When $p=2$, the conditional
expectation $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ be recovered. Dependent upon the value of $p$ , the certainty equivalent generated
by this error functional exhibits different sensitivity to events’ probabilities. $M$ is very sensitive
to probabihties when $p$ is close to one, while large $p$ shows the insensitivity of $M$ to probabihties.
To see this, let $\Omega=\{\omega_{1},\omega_{2}\}$ , and let $(\forall i)p_{\dot{2}}\equiv\mu(\{\omega_{i}\})>0$ . When $p=1,$ $M(x)=x(\omega_{i})$ , where
$i=\arg \mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}s\mathrm{c}_{j}p_{\mathrm{j}}$. (When there is a tie, $M(x)$ is any convex combination of such $x(\omega_{i})’ \mathrm{s}.$ ) On the
other hand, when $p=+\infty,$ $M(x)=(’1/2)(x(\omega_{1})+x(\omega_{2}))$ regardless of $p_{i}’ \mathrm{s}$ .
For $p\neq 2,$ $M(x)\neq M(M(x|\mathcal{G}))$ in general as the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathbb{I}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma$ simple example shows. Let
$\Omega=\{\omega_{1},\omega_{2},\omega_{3}\};(\forall i)p_{i}\equiv\mu(\{\omega_{i}\});\mathcal{G}=\{\phi, \{\omega_{1}\}, \{\omega_{2},\omega_{3}\}, \Omega\};x_{1}\equiv x(\omega_{1})=x(\omega_{2})<x_{3}\equiv$




The several lines of algebra show that
$M(x)\geq M(M(x|\mathcal{G}))\Leftrightarrow p\geq 2$ .
$\mathrm{A}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}_{\Leftrightarrow}\sigma \mathrm{h}$ this example is very specific and general cases seem to be very complicated, some
intuition can be derived ffom this example. First, assume that $p>2$ . For this case, an interme-
diate $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\circ \mathrm{o}^{\mathrm{T}\mathrm{e}}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}(i.e., M(x|\mathcal{G}))$ dampens (resp. promotes) the mean when the aggregation takes
place among better (resp. worse) outcomes. This is because the dues of outcomes (rather than
the associated probabihties) count more and the best (resp. worst) outcome is always averaged
downward (resp. upward). In the above example, the intermediate aggregation lowers the best
outcome and hence dampens the mean. Next, assume that $p<2$ . For this case, an interme-
diate aggregation $(i.e., M(x|\mathcal{G}))$ promotes (resp. dampens) the mean when the relatively high
probabihties are associated with the lower (resp. higher) outcomes. This is because the increase
of the probabihty of better (resp. worse) events by the aggregation may cause the reversal of
relative probabilities between better outcomes and worse outcomes. In the above example, the
aggregation causes the increase in the probabihty of better outcome, which contributes increase
of the mean.
B. Asymmetric Error ffinctional
Let $p\in(1, +\infty)$ and let $\gamma>0$ . The $asymmet7^{\cdot}icer7vr$ fimctional is defined by:
$\Phi(x, z)\equiv(\int_{\Omega}\phi(x(\omega), z(\omega))d\mu(\omega))^{1/p}$ , where $\phi(x, z)=\{$
$\gamma|x-z|^{\mathrm{p}}$ if $x\geq z$
$|x-z|^{p}$ if $x<z$ .
When $\gamma<1$ , the certainty equivalent generated by this error functional is a parametric speci-
fication of preferences studied by Gul (1991), and aehibits disappointment aversion. This error
functional measures the approximation errors asymmetricaUy. That is, an underestimate is tol-
erated (resp. penalized) compared with an overestimate when $\gamma<1$ (resp. $\gamma>1$ ). This error
functional can be generated ffom the asymmetric “norm” which is defined in the next lemma.
Lemma 3.1: Let $p\in(1, +\infty)$ and let a, $b>0$ . Define $\gamma:\Rearrow\Re$ by
$(\forall x\in\Re)$ $\gamma(x)=\{$
$a$ if $x\geq 0$
$b$ if $x<0$ .
Finally, define $||x||_{\gamma}$ by
$||x||_{\gamma}=( \int_{\Omega}\gamma(x)|x|^{p}d\mu)^{1/p}$
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Then $(\forall x, z\in X)$ $||x+z||_{\gamma}\leq||x||_{\gamma}+||z||_{\gamma}$ . Furthemort, $||x+z||_{\gamma}<||x||_{\gamma}+||z||_{\gamma}$ urdess
$(\exists c>0)x=cz$ . (Proof in Appendix)
Proposition 3.2: The asymmetric $em\tau$ functional is wdl-defined.
Proof: By Lemma 2.1, it suffices to prove that $\hat{\Phi}(x)=||x||_{\gamma}$ satisfies NI-N7. NI-N4
are obvious. N5 and N6 $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}$ ffom Lemma 3.1. $\mathrm{N}7’$ holds with $K=( \max\{a,b\})^{1/\mathrm{p}}$. $\square$
When$p=2$, this error $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{m}$. ctional has a convenient implication on the value of information
as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 3.3: Let $M$ be genemted by the asymmetric error fimctional urith $p=2$.
Then for any $\mathcal{G}$ and for any $x,$ $M(x)\geq M(M(x|\mathcal{G}))\Leftrightarrow\gamma\leq 1$ . (Proof in Appendix)
C. Quasilinear Error Functional
For this example, aet $X$ to be the positive cone of $L^{\infty}(F)$ , and let $\alpha>0$ . The quasdinear
error $fi_{4}nctional$ is defined by:
$\Phi(x, z)\equiv\int_{\Omega}\phi(x(\omega),z(\omega))d\mu(\omega)$ , where $\phi(x, z)=\alpha x^{\alpha+1}-(\alpha+1)x^{\alpha}z+z^{\alpha+1}$
When $\alpha=1$ , the conditional expectation $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ be recovered. The certainty equivalent generated
by this error functional is a parametric family of quasihnear mean, $(E[x^{a}])^{1/\alpha}$ .
Proposition 3.4: The quasilinear error functional $\dot{u}$ wdl-defined.
Proof: This is a special case of Proposition 3.5. $\square$
By Lemma 2.3, we can compute $M(x|\mathcal{G})$ explicitly as $(\forall x)(\forall \mathcal{G})M(x|\mathcal{G})=(E[x^{\alpha}|\mathcal{G}])^{1/\alpha}$ .
Hence, for this error functional, the value of information is always $0$ because $M(M(x|\mathcal{G}))=$
$(E[E[x^{\alpha}|\mathcal{G}]])^{1/\alpha}=(E[x^{\alpha}])^{1/\alpha}=M(x)$ .
D. Implicit Error Functional
For this exampk, we first define the certainty equivalent, and then seek for the error
functional which generates this certainty equivalent. Given $x\in X,$ $M(x)$ is defined as the
unique solution $z\in\Re$ to
$\int_{\Omega}\varphi(x(\omega), z)d\mu(\omega)=0$
where $\varphi$ : $\Re^{2}arrow\Re$ satisfies: (i) $\varphi(x, x)=0,$ (\"u) $(\forall x)\varphi(x, \cdot)$ is strictly decreasing, and (\"ui)
$(\forall x)\varphi(x, \cdot)$ is continuous. Note that $z=M(x)$ is $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{U}$-defined by the mean value theorem This
certainty equivalent, $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ implicit mean, was studied by Fishburn (1986). By the continuity
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(\"ui), there exists $\phi\wedge:$ $\Re^{2}arrow\Re$ such that $(\forall x, z)\phi_{2}(x, z)\wedge=-\varphi(x, z)$ . Furthermore, $\phi(x, \cdot)\wedge$ is
strictly convex by $(\ddot{\mathrm{n}})$ and has a minimum at $z=x$ by (i). FinaUy, let $\phi(x, z)\equiv\phi(x, z)-\phi(x, x)\wedge\wedge$ .
We define the implicit error fimctional by:
$\Phi(x,z)\equiv\int_{\Omega}\phi(x(\omega), z(\omega))d\mu(\omega)$ .
Note that the quasilinear error functional is recovered when $\varphi(x, z)=(\alpha+1)x^{\alpha}-(\alpha+1)z^{\alpha}$.
Proposition 3.5: The implicit error functional is $wdl$-defined, and it genemtes the
implicit mean $M(x)$ .
Proof: EI-E6 $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}$ sinoe $\phi(x, \cdot)$ is a strictly convex $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ which has the minimized
value $0$ at $z=x$. E7 holds by Aubin and Ekeland (1984, p. 13) sinoe $\phi(x, \cdot)$ is continuous. The
second statement in the proposition is obvious by Lemma 2.3. $\square$
By the construction of $\Phi$ and Proposition 3.5, we can always find the error functional
which generates the $0\sigma \mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}$ implicit mean. The value of information is non-zero except when $\varphi$
is separabk (as in Example C).
E. Rank-dependent Error Functional
Let $\theta$ be a normalized capacity on $(\Omega,\mathcal{F})$ , that is, 9: $Farrow[0,1]$ is a mapping which
satisfies $\theta(\phi)=0,$ $\theta(\Omega)=1$ , and $A\subset B\Rightarrow\theta(A)\leq\theta(B)$ . We $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ ako assume that $\theta$ is convex
in the sense that $\theta(A\cup B)+\theta(A\cap B)\geq\theta(A)+\theta(B)$ . A simple exampk of a convex capacity is
$(\forall A)\theta(A)=(\mu(A))^{\alpha}$ , where $\alpha\geq 1$ . Let $X$ be the positive cone of $L^{\infty}(\mathcal{F})$ . A Choquet integml
with respect to a capacity $\theta$ is defined by:
$(\forall x\in X)$ $\int_{\Omega}x(\omega)\theta(\ ) \equiv\int_{0}^{\infty}\theta(\{\omega\in\Omega|x(\omega)\geq t\})dt$ ,
where the integral in the right-hand side is an improper Riemann (or equivalently, Lebesgue)
$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma \mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}1$ . The Choquet $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\circ\tau \mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\circ$ cruciaUy depends upon the ranking of outcomes, and (given
$\theta’ \mathrm{s}$ convexity) it captures the notion of uncertainty aversion (for exampk, see Gilboa, 1987,
Schmeidler, 1989, and Chateauxneuf, 1991).
We construct the error functional which generates the oertainty equivalent defined by
the Choquet $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\circ\tau \mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\circ\cdot$ To this end, we introduce a couple of concepts. We denote by $ba$ the space
of bounded charges. That is, $ba$ is the space of bounded finitely additive set fimctions on $(\Omega,\mathcal{F})$
which are $\mathrm{n}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{U}$ at $\phi$ and absolutely continuous with respect to $\mu$ . Note that $ba=(L^{\infty}(\mathcal{F}))^{*}$ ,
the topological dual of $L^{\infty}(F)$ . Let { $\varphi_{n})$ be a nondecreasing sequence of simpk functions which
uniformly converges to $x$ . Such a sequence always exists. Then the Dunford-Schwartz integml
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of $x\in X$ with respect to $\nu\in ba$ is defined by
$\int_{\Omega}x(\omega)\nu(h)\equiv\lim_{\mathrm{n}arrow\infty}\int_{\Omega}\varphi_{\mathfrak{n}}(\omega)\nu(h)$ ,
where the integrak of simple functions in the RHS are defined in the same manner as for an
integral.with respect to a measure. The $\mathrm{h}\iota\dot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{t}$ exists and is independent of the choioe of the
sequence of simple fimctions (Danford and Schwartz, 1954, p. 111). Finally, the core of the
normalized capacity 9 is defined by
core(9) $=$ { $\nu\in ba|(\forall A\in F)\mathit{9}(A)\leq\nu(A)$ and $\nu(\Omega)=1$ }.
It immediately $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ that $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}(\mathit{9})\backslash$ is weak * compact. The $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ lemma is due to Schmeidler
(1986):
Lemma 3.6: Let 9 be a normalized oepacity. Then $\theta$ is convex if and only if
$(\forall x\in X)$ $\int_{\Omega}xd\theta=\mathrm{m}\dot{\mathrm{m}}\{\int_{\Omega}xd\nu|\nu\in \mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}(\theta)\}$ .
We now define the error functional. Let $\theta$ be a normalized capacity which is convex.
Then define a mapping $xrightarrow\nu_{x}$ ffom $X$ into core $(\theta)$ such that
$\int_{\Omega}xd\theta=\int_{\Omega}xd\nu_{x}$ ,
where the RHS is the Dunford-Schwartz $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma \mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}1$ . Such a mapping exists by Lemma 3.6 while it
is not unique in general. We define the $mnk$-dependent $\mathrm{e}$rror functional $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{y}^{9}$.
$\Phi(x, z)\equiv\int_{\Omega}(x(\omega)-z(\omega))^{2}d\nu_{x}(\omega)$ .
Note that the integral is again in the sense of Dunford and Schwartz since $\nu_{x}$ is a charge rather
than a measure. We can prove
Proposition 3.7: The $mnk$-dependent error functional is well-defined, and it genemtes
the Choquet integml. (Proof in Appendix)
For this error functional, the value of information is in general non-zero. Lemma 2.3
(and the similar argument to the proof of Proposition 3.7) shows
$M(x)= \int_{\Omega}xd\nu_{x}=\int_{\Omega}M(x|\mathcal{G})d\nu_{x}$ ,
but the last expression does not equal $M(M(x|\mathcal{G}))$ since $\nu_{x}$ and $\nu_{M(x|\mathcal{G})}$ are in general different.
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4. Application to 2-Period Dynamic Model: An Example
The general two-period model is daecribed as follows. Let $(\Omega,F,\mu)$ be the set of $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$
possibk states of the world of tomorrow together with $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$ conoeivabk events and a probabihty
measure on it. And let $c_{0}$ and $c_{1}$ be a consumption of today and of tomorrow, respectively.
$c_{0}$ is a non-negative real and $c_{1}$ : $\Omegaarrow\Re_{+}$ is a function of tomorrow’s state. The feasibihty
of a consumption plan is described by the compact-valued and $F$-measurabk correspondence
$F:\Omegaarrow\Re_{+}^{2}$ . It $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ be required that $(\forall\omega)(c_{0},c_{1}(\omega))\in F(\omega)$. A function $u:\Omegaarrow\Re$ is a
$F$-measurabk utihty function which gives future’s utihty given tomorrow’s state $\omega$ . A function
$W:\Re_{+}\cross\Rearrow\Re$ is an intertemporal aggregator which generates today’s utihty given today’s
consumption and tomorrow’s “mean” utility. In order to caluculate tomorrow’s “mean” utihty,
the agent employs the certainty equivalent $M$ which is generated by some error ffinctional.
The information structure of the model is as $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ . Let $F^{*}$ be the spaoe of $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{b}-\sigma-$
algebras of $F$, and let $\mathcal{G}^{*}$ be some subset of $F^{*}$ . Today, the agent chooses any $\mathcal{G}\in \mathcal{G}^{*}$ together
with a feasibk consumption plan $(c_{0}, c_{1})$ . The information $\mathcal{G}$ will be revealed to the agent
tomorrow, and $\mathrm{c}_{1}$ must be chosen so as to be $\mathcal{G}$-measurable. Therefore, the finer $\mathcal{G}$ is, the more
variety of functions the agent can consider as a possibk plan of tomorrow’s consumption $c_{1}$ .
This substantiates the idea that the $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{d}\backslash \mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$ information contributes the utihty by $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$
the more flexible planning. FinaUy, the utihty of tomorrow $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ be computed as a conditional
utihty given $\mathcal{G}$ , and this conditional utihty $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ be $\mathrm{a}_{\Leftrightarrow}\sigma \mathrm{g}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$again over states by $M$ to generate
“mean” utihty of tomorrow. When $M$ is given by the expectation operator $E$ and when $W$ is
linear in its second argument, this doubk aggregation lea&to the identical “mean” utihty
$\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma\pi \mathrm{d}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}$ of $\mathcal{G}$ . But since $M$ need not be $E$ now, the “mean” utihty may be affected by the
choice of $\mathcal{G}$ .
In a summary, the agent chooses $c_{0},$ $c_{1}$ , and $\mathcal{G}$ to maximize:
$W(c_{0}, M[W(c_{1}(\omega), M[u(\omega)|\mathcal{G}])])$ (7)
subject to $\{$
$(\forall\omega\in\Omega)$ $(c_{0}, c_{1}(\omega))\in F(\omega)$
$\mathcal{G}\in g*$ and
$c_{1}$ is $\mathcal{G}$-measurable.
When $W(c, m)=v(c)+\beta m$ and $M=E$, where $v:\Re_{+}arrow\Re,$ $\beta>0$ and $E$ is an expectation




Here $\mathcal{G}$ vanishes, and hence it cannot affect the overaU utihty. More idormation is always
preferred. Next suppose that $W(c,m)=m$. Eqaution (7) is now reduced to
$M[M[u(\omega)|\mathcal{G}]]$
Henoe if $M\neq E,$ $\mathcal{G}$ could ffiect the overaU utihty even for this simple intertemporal aggregator.
A finer $\mathcal{G}$ leads to better plannin$\mathrm{g}$, but it $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}\backslash$ not be preferred according to the anti-
preference for information itself. To illustrate this point, we now provide a specific exampk of
the above model in whi& the attainmment of new information (and hence more flexibk planning)
may not necessarily improve the agent’s overaU utihty.
Infomation Stmcture. Let $\Omega=\{\omega_{1},\omega_{2},\omega_{3}\};\mathcal{F}=2^{\Omega};(\forall i)p_{i}\equiv\mu(\{\omega_{i}\});\mathcal{G}_{0}\equiv\{\phi, \Omega\}$ ;
$\mathcal{G}_{1}\equiv\{\phi,\{\omega_{1}\}, \{\omega_{2},\omega_{3}\},\Omega\}$ ; and $\mathcal{G}^{*}=\{\mathcal{G}_{0}, \mathcal{G}_{1}\}$ . For this simple example, the agent has only
two alternatives: no information at $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$ or partial information which can’t distinguish state 2
&om state 3. We assume that it takes no cost obtaining information.
Feasibility. Let $\epsilon>0$ and let $\overline{c}>0$ . The feasibihty correspondence is given by:
$(\forall\omega)F(\omega)=\{$
{ $(x_{0},x_{1})\in\Re_{+}^{2}|x_{0}=0$ and $0\leq x_{1}\leq\overline{c}$ } if $\omega=\omega_{1}$
{ $(x_{0},x_{1})\in\Re_{+}^{2}|x_{0}=0$ and $0\leq x_{1}\leq\overline{c}+\epsilon$ } if $\omega=\omega_{2}$ or $\omega_{3}$
When $g_{0}$ is chosen by the agent, the best consumption availabk tomorrow is given by $(\forall\omega)c_{1}(\omega)=$
$\overline{c}$ . When $\mathcal{G}_{1}$ is chosen by the agent, the best consumption availabk tomorrow is given by
$c_{1}(\omega_{1})=\overline{c}$ and $\mathrm{c}_{1}(\omega_{2})=c_{1}(\omega_{3})=\overline{c}+\epsilon$ . The more information leads to a better consumption of
tomorrow as we expect.
Prejerence. Let $b>0$ . Define $W$ by $(\forall c,m)W(c, m)=c+m$ and $u$ by
$(\forall\omega)u(\omega)=\{$
$0$ if $\omega=\omega_{1}$ or $\omega_{2}$
$b$ if $\omega=\omega_{3}$
The state 3 is special in the sense that the agent gets a bonus utility $b$ only when this state
is realized. FinaUy, the certainty equivalent $M$ is the one generated by the $L^{p}$ error functional
(which was introduced in Section 3. $\mathrm{A}$). Under these specifications, equation (7) is reduced to
$M(c_{1}(\omega)+M(u(\omega)|\mathcal{G}))$ .
Let $\gamma=1/(p-1)$ . The overaU maximum utihty when the agent chooses $\mathcal{G}_{0}$ is given by:
$U_{0} \equiv\overline{c}+M(u(\omega))=\overline{c}+\frac{p_{3}^{\gamma}}{(p_{1}+p_{2})^{\gamma}+p_{3}^{\gamma}}b$ .
On the other hand, the overaU maximum utility when the agent chooses $\mathcal{G}_{1}$ is given by:
$U_{1}$ $\equiv M(\mathrm{c}_{1}(\omega)+M(u(\omega)|\mathcal{G}))$ where $c_{1}(\omega)=\{$
$\overline{c}$ if $\omega=\omega_{1}$
$\overline{c}+\epsilon$ if $\omega=\omega_{2}$ or $\omega_{3}$
$= \overline{c}+\frac{(p_{2}+p_{3})^{\gamma}}{(p_{1}^{\gamma}+(\mathrm{p}_{2}+p\mathrm{s})^{\gamma})}\epsilon+\frac{p_{3}^{\gamma}(p_{2}+p_{3})^{\gamma}}{(p_{2}^{\gamma}+p_{3}^{\gamma})(p_{1}^{\gamma}+(p_{2}+p_{3})^{\gamma})}b$.
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As the exampk in Section 3. $\mathrm{A}$ shows, $U_{0}=M(x)\leq M(M(x’|\mathcal{G}))=U_{1}$ when $p\leq 2$ . In this case,
obtaining partial idformation merits the $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma \mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ utihty (partly because of the better planning
and partly because of the preference for information itself). On the contrary, when $p>2$ and
$\epsilon$ is $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$ enough (or, $b$ is large enough), $U_{0}=\dot{M}(x)>M(M(x’|\mathcal{G}))=U_{1}$ . For instanoe, when
$p>2$ (and hence $\gamma<1$ ) and $p_{1}=p_{2}=p_{3}$ , it immediately $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ that $U_{0}>U_{1}$ if (and only if)
$b>[2^{\gamma}/(1-2^{\gamma-1})]\epsilon$ . In this case, the agent prefers to remain uninformed rather than become
idformed. This is becauae the anti-preference for information dominates the merit by the better
planning.
5. Concluding Remarks
The simple exampk of 2–period model in Section 4 shows that the agent with a general
error functional (which may be different&om $L^{2}$-norm) can exhibit a strict preference or a strict
anii-preference for information, the latter ofwhich sometimes dominates even the merit of better
planning. In this manner, the non-Hilbert conditioning $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ us to make more general modek in
which the information $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ bejurisdictionaUy chosen by the agent and hence will be endogenized.
In the traditional dynamic modek, the accumulation of agent’s information is exogenously given
by some filtration of $\sigma$-algebras. In another word, the choice of variables the agent observes
to obtain information is out of her control (where the filtration is generated by the variables).
Multi-period (in particular, infinite-horizon) modek with the non-Hilbert conditionin$\mathrm{g}$ contrast
with the traditional ones and would provide new economic implications by $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}_{\mathrm{O}}^{\sigma}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{z}i\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ the
problem of which variables to observe. In an attempt to analyze such modek ($\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{d}\dot{\mathrm{m}}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma$ the
general 2-period model described at the beginning of Section 4), it would be necessary to study
the existence of the optimal information level, which in turn requires the “continuity” of $M(x|\cdot)$
with respect to some information topology on $F^{*}$ . To this end, we would need to extend the
argument developed by Allen (1983), which employs Boylan’s (1971) topology for information.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 2.1: The $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ implications are mediate: $\mathrm{N}1\Rightarrow \mathrm{E}1;\mathrm{N}2\Rightarrow$
E2; $\mathrm{N}3\Rightarrow \mathrm{E}3$; and $\mathrm{N}7\Rightarrow \mathrm{E}6$ . N4 and N5 imply E4 sinoe:





$=$ $\lambda\Phi(x, z_{1})+(1-\lambda)\Phi(x, z_{2})$ .
FinaUy we prove E5. The inequality in (8) is strict unless there exists $c\in\Re_{+}$ such that
$\lambda(x-z_{1})=c(1-\lambda)(x-z_{2})$ , which is the case only when $\lambda-c(1-\lambda)=0$ or $x$ is a linear
combination of $z_{1}$ and $z_{2}$ . But the both are impossible under the presupposition of E5. $\square$
Proof of Proposition 2.2: Let $x\in X$ . Then there exists $b\in\Re_{+}$ such that $|x|\leq b$.
Define
$(L^{\infty}( \mathcal{G}))_{b}\equiv\{x\in L^{\infty}(\mathcal{G})|\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}\sup_{\omega\in\Omega}|x(\omega)|\leq b\}$ .
We can look for $z$ in $(L^{\infty}(\mathcal{G}))_{b}$ because $x-(z\wedge b)\vee(-b)\preceq x-z$ and because it implies
$\Phi(x, (z\wedge b)\vee(-b))\leq\Phi(x, z)$ by E3.
Let ( $z_{n}\rangle_{n=1}^{\infty}$ be a sequence in $(L^{\infty}(\mathcal{G}))_{b}$ such $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}^{\mathit{1}\sim}$.
$\Phi(x,z_{n})arrow\dot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{f}\Phi(x, z)z\equiv\inf\{\Phi(x, z)|z\in(L^{\infty}(\mathcal{G}))_{b}\}$ . (9)
Since $(L^{\infty}(F))_{b}$ is weak * compact, there exists a subsequence ($z_{n}.\cdot\rangle_{i=1}^{\infty}$ and $z_{0}\in(L^{\infty}(\mathcal{F}))_{b}$ such
that $z_{n}\dot{.}$ converges to $z_{0}$ in the weak * topology. We $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ show that $z_{0}\in(L^{\infty}(\mathcal{G}))_{b}$ in the rest
of this paragraph. Fix $p$ with which $\Phi$ meets E6 and let $q$ be its conjugate (When $p=1$ , let
$q=+\infty)$ . We claim that $z_{n}.\cdot$ converges to $z_{0}$ in the weak topology of $L^{p}(\Omega,F,\mu)$ . To see this,
note that $z_{n:}$ and $z_{0}$ live in $IP$ , and that, by the definition of the weak * topology,
$(\forall x\in L^{1})$ $\int_{\Omega}xz_{n:}d\muarrow\int_{\Omega}xz_{0}d\mu$ .
The claim $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ because $L^{q}\subset L^{1}$ and $L^{q}=(L^{p})^{*}$ . Therefore, some sequenoe of convex
combinations of the elements $z_{n:}$ converges to $z_{0}$ in the $IP$-norm by the Mazur’s kmma. Then
some subsequenoe of this sequence converges to $z_{0}$ ahnost everywhere. Since each component of
this subsequenoe is almost $\mathcal{G}$-measurable, $z_{0}$ is also ahnost $\mathcal{G}$-measurabk.
This paragraph proves that $\Phi(x, z_{0})=\mathrm{i}\mathrm{d}_{z}\Phi(x, z)$ . Because $z_{n}.\cdot$ converges to $z_{0}$ in the
weak topology by the aecond paragraph, and because $\Phi(x, \cdot)$ is lower semi-continuous in the
weak topology by E4 and E6, $\underline{\mathrm{h}\mathrm{m}}_{narrow\infty}\Phi(x, z_{n:})\geq\Phi(x,z_{0})$ , whi&implies $\Phi(x, z_{0})=\mathrm{i}\mathrm{d}_{z}\Phi(x,z)$
by (9).
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FinaUy, we prove the uniqueness. If $x$ is ahnost $\mathcal{G}$-measurabk, $z=x$ attains the unique
min$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\iota \mathrm{m}$ by El and E2. Assume that $x$ is not almost $\mathcal{G}$-measurable, and that ahnost $\mathcal{G}-$
measurabk distinct functions $z_{1}$ and $z_{2}$ both attain the minimum. But this contradicts E5.
$\square$
Proof of Lemma 3.1: If $x=0$ or $z=0$ , the conclusion is trivial. Henoe assume that
$||x||_{\gamma}\equiv\alpha>0$ and $||z||_{\gamma}\equiv\beta>0$ . Define $x_{0}=x/\alpha$ and $z_{0}=z/\beta$ . Then $\alpha x_{0}=x$ and $||x_{0}||_{\gamma}=1$
(since $||\cdot||_{\gamma}$ is positively $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}_{\circ}^{\sigma}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}$ ). The same is true for $z_{0}$ . If we define $\lambda=\alpha/(\alpha+\beta)$ ,
then
$\gamma(x+z)|x+z|^{\mathrm{p}}$
$=\gamma(\alpha x_{0}+\beta z_{0})|\alpha x_{0}+\beta z_{0}|^{\mathrm{p}}$
$=\gamma(\lambda(\alpha+\beta)x_{0}+(1-\lambda)(\alpha+\beta)z_{0})|\lambda(\alpha+\beta)x_{0}+(1-\lambda)(\alpha+\beta)z_{0}|^{p}$
$=$ $(\alpha+\beta)^{p}\gamma(\lambda x_{0}+(1-\lambda)z_{0})|\lambda x_{0}+(1-\lambda)z_{0}|^{p}$
$\leq$ $(\alpha+\beta)^{p}(\lambda\gamma(x_{0})|x_{0}|^{p}+(1-\lambda)\gamma(z_{0})|z_{0}|^{p})$ ,
where the last equality holds since $\alpha+\beta>0$ , and the inequality hol&(with an equality only






By taking $p$-root, the proof is completed. $\square$
Proof of Proposition 3.3: Define $\varphi:\Re^{2}arrow\Re$ by
$\varphi(x, z)=\{$
$\gamma(x-z)$ if $x\geq z$
$x-z$ if $X<Z$
Then $M(x)$ is defined as a unique solution $z$ to $\int_{\Omega}\varphi(x(\omega), z)d\mu(\omega)$ .




where $\varphi_{1}^{+}$ and $\varphi_{1}^{-}$ are right-hand-side and $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}- \mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$-side derivatives, respectively. Hence




Note that $\int_{\Omega}\varphi_{2}^{-}(x(\omega),M(x))d\mu\leq 0$, and that $\int_{\Omega}\varphi_{1}^{+}(x(\omega), M(x))[M(x|\mathcal{G})-x]d\mu\geq 0$ because
$\int_{\Omega}\varphi_{1}^{+}(x(\omega), M(x))[M(x|\mathcal{G})-x]d\mu($
$=$ $\int_{\{x\geq M(x)\}}\gamma(M(x|\mathcal{G})-x)d\mu+\int_{\{x<M(x)\}}(M(x|\mathcal{G})-x)d\mu$
$=$ $( \gamma-1)\int_{\{x\geq M(x)\}}(M(x|\mathcal{G})-x)d\mu+\int_{\Omega}(M(x|\mathcal{G})-x)d\mu$
$\geq$ $( \gamma-1)\int_{\{x\geq M(x|\mathcal{G})\}}(M(x|\mathcal{G})-x)d\mu+\int_{\Omega}(M(x|\mathcal{G})-x)d\mu$
$=$ $0$ ,
where the last equality holds by Lemma 2.3. This completes the proof for $\gamma>1$ . The similar
argument applies for $\gamma<1$ . $\square$
Proof of Proposition 3.7: EI-E6 are obvious. Yoshida-Hewitt theorem claims
$(\forall x)\nu_{x}=\nu_{x}^{\mathrm{c}}+\nu_{x}^{\mathrm{p}}$ , where $\nu_{x}^{\mathrm{c}}$ is a countably additive part of $\nu_{x}$ and $\nu_{x}^{p}$ is a pure charge, both of
which are nonnegative. Hence, $\Phi(x, z)\geq\int_{\Omega}(x-z)^{2}d\nu_{x}^{\mathrm{c}}$ , ffom whi&the lower semi-continuity
of $\Phi$ in $z\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathbb{I}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ in a usual manner since $\nu_{x}^{\mathrm{c}}$ is now a measure.
To show that $\Phi$ generates the Choquet $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}_{\mathrm{o}}\circ\tau \mathrm{a}1$ , let $\langle$ $z_{n})_{n}$ be a sequence of real numbers
whi&converges to $z$ . Then $((x(\omega)-z_{n})^{2}-(x(\omega)-z)^{2})/(z_{n}-z)$ converges to $(d/dz)(w(\omega)-z)^{2}$
in “&arge’’ because
$(\forall\omega)$ $| \frac{(x(\omega)-z_{n})^{2}-(x(\omega)-z)^{2}}{z_{n}-z}-\frac{d}{dz}(w(\omega)-z)^{2}|=|z_{n}-z|$ .
Therefore, by the dominated convergence theorem for charges (Rao and Rao, 1983, p. 131),
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